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Abstract
We merge a financial market model with leverage-constrained, heterogeneous agents with a reduced-
form version of the New-Keynesian standard model. Agents in both submodels are assumed to be
boundedly rational. The financial market model produces endogenously arising boom-bust cycles.
It is also capable to generate highly non-linear deleveraging processes, fire sales and ultimately a
default scenario. Asset price booms are triggered via self-fulfilling prophecies. Asset price busts are
induced by agents’ choice of an increasingly fragile balance sheet structure during good times. Their
vulnerability is inevitably revealed by small, randomly occurring shocks. Our transmission channel
of financial market activity to the real sector embraces a recent strand of literature shedding light on
the link between the active balance sheet management of financial market participants, the induced
procyclical fluctuations of desired risk compensations and their final impact on the real economy. We
show that a systematic central bank reaction on financial market developments dampens macroeco-
nomic volatility considerably. Furthermore, restricting leverage in a countercyclical fashion limits the
magnitude of financial cycles and hence their impact on the real economy.
Keywords: Behavioral economics, New-Keynesian macroeconomics, monetary policy, agent-based finan-
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risk.
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1 Introduction
The recent crisis has drastically shown the immense impact of financial instability on macroeconomic
outcomes. However, models linking financial cycles and the real economy are scarce so far.1 This
triggered our motivation to construct an integrated macro-finance model which allows us to analyze the
stylized impact of financial cycles on key variables such as inflation and output and to derive important
implications for monetary policy and for macroprudential regulation. For this purpose we merge a
financial market model with leverage-constrained, heterogeneous agents with a reduced-form version of
the New-Keynesian standard model. Agents in both submodels are assumed to be boundedly rational.
The financial market model produces endogenously arising boom-bust cycles. In addition, it generates
highly non-linear deleveraging processes, fire sales and ultimately a default scenario as soon as the leverage
constraint becomes binding.
The interaction channels between our two submodels are as follows: Asset price booms boost aggre-
gate demand since they induce a decrease of the risk-adjusted real interest rate while a widened output
gap in turn affects the perceived fundamental value of the representative asset on the financial market.
Thus financial market developments are found to be the key source of economic fluctuations in our model.
Asset price booms are triggered endogenously via self-fulfilling prophecies and translate into positive out-
put gaps and upward deviations of inflation from its target rate. In turn, asset price busts are induced
by agents’ choice of an increasingly fragile balance sheet structure during good times. Their vulnera-
bility is inevitably revealed by small, randomly occurring shocks which cause the need for simultaneous
deleveraging or even lead to defaults. Subsequently we obtain a pronounced increase of both the macro
risk premium and the risk-adjusted real interest rate and a sharp contraction of economic activity. Our
setup enables us to discuss a wide range of policy measures. We show that a systematic central bank
reaction on financial market developments dampens macroeconomic volatility considerably. Furthermore,
restricting leverage in a countercyclical fashion limits the magnitude of financial cycles and hence their
impact on the real economy.
1 For example, the work of Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) features sophisticated micro-
founded DSGE models augmented with financial sectors. They are able to replicate the stylized pattern of a systemic
crisis and its real economy-impact. However these models are silent on the endogenous build-up of financial imbalances
over time. Instead, a state of financial instability is induced by exogenous shocks, for instance to capital quality or to
default rates.
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2 Literature
2.1 Central banks and financial procyclicality
The financial crisis not surprisingly led to a reintensification of the debate whether monetary policy
should pursue a financial stability objective. The so-called ’pre-crisis consensus’ stated that monetary
policy should react to financial market developments only to the extent that they directly affect inflation
and output (Issing, 2011). To preemptively tackle unsustainable developments via interest rate policy was
regarded as theoretically questionable and practically infeasible.2 However, the recent crisis once more
demonstrated that widespread financial instability poses a serious threat to output and price stability. The
ECB (2010) hence started to show some sympathy for a preemptive policy approach, even at the expense of
a potential increase of short-term inflation variability. In addition, both policymakers and academics use
to call for a second policy instrument. Of major importance is the concept of macroprudential regulation
(Borio, 2003; BoE, 2009; ECB, 2009). It can be described as a set of supervision measures which aim to
mitigate the procyclicality of the financial system as a whole, especially by employing tighter and time-
varying capital requirements and higher liquidity standards. Even though there are two instruments
for two policy goals, it is no longer possible to make a clear-cut distinction between monetary policy
exclusively fostering price-stability and macroprudential supervision which exclusively tries to dampen
financial procyclicality. Both policy fields are interdependent (Bean, 2010). Most importantly, the stance
of monetary policy affects financial market developments but the stance of macroprudential regulation
might also affect the real economy.
Our model accounts for both policy instruments. We allow the central bank to react to financial
market developments in order to prevent adverse spillovers to the real economy. And we also include the
sense of macroprudential regulation by introducing the additional instrument of countercyclical leverage
caps.
2.2 Theoretical treatment of financial procyclicality
With the obvious benefit of hindsight, pre-crisis thinking and modeling of financial procyclicality in a
macro context turned out to be insufficient. In our view, one can identify two major shortcomings.
Firstly, the debate focused on asset price bubbles emerging in partial sectors - usually stock markets
- and the difficult task of tracing out fundamental asset prices. Today, academics and policymakers
2 Pros and contras of this view has been extensively discussed by Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Cecchetti (2000), Filardo
(2001), Roubini (2006), Posen (2006), Bernanke (2010) and others.
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rather focus on the broader concept of financial procyclicality.3 Financial procyclicality means, that the
financial system with its frictions endogenously amplifies or even determines business cycle dynamics
in a welfare-decreasing way (Borio and Lowe, 2001). It is noteworthy that this definition includes the
possibility of non-linear crisis events, but their incidence is not necessary.
Secondly, financial frictions - if they showed up in a macro model at all - were thought to lie on the
borrower’s side in the form of a financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1995).
During the last years the focus shifted towards the lender’s side in the process of financial intermedia-
tion, that is towards banks and other intermediaries. The theory of the risk-taking channel postulates a
systematic relationship between the stance of monetary policy, the level of economic activity and the risk
attitudes of financial investors (Borio and Zhu, 2008). It is argued that expansionary monetary policy
triggers endogenous responses of financial market agents, boosting their risk appetite. For example, if
agents operate under sticky return targets, a policy-induced decrease of the general level of interest rates
might force them into riskier engagements (Rajan, 2005). But the probably most important subchannel
is determined by the dynamics of leverage and by an active balance sheet management of financial in-
termediaries. (See i.a. Adrian and Shin (2009a) and Adrian and Shin (2010)). Under mark-to-market
accounting, rising asset prices lead to an improved equity base and hence to a lower leverage ratio. In
order to entirely use their now increased balance sheet capacity, financial investors issue debt securities
and use the cash inflows to purchase additional assets. This finally creates a perverse demand schedule,
since demand goes up despite of increasing asset prices and decreasing returns. This mechanism implies
a greater risk appetite, as financial investors are willing to hold the same assets with lower returns which
implies a decrease of the desired risk compensation.
Adrian et al. (2010) indeed show, that the so-called ’macro risk premium’ - which serves as a proxy
for the price of a unit of non-diversifiable market risk - is inversely related to the risk appetite of financial
investors. Risk appetite in turn is positively connected to variables capturing balance sheet growth,
especially that of market-based intermediaries. Since the expansion of balance sheets is mainly driven by
short-term collateralized borrowing, monetary policy crucially affects the conditions of these operations
by setting the level of the short-term interest rate. Hence, the stance of monetary policy and financial
stability are closely intertwined. The described mechanism obviously also works in an adverse way. Falling
asset prices lower the capital base. In order to restore the desired leverage ratio, intermediaries have to
3 Weber (2008:3) notes that “[t]he debate about monetary policy and financial markets is too often slanted to the
question on how to deal with asset price bubbles. [. . . ] In my opinion, the view of monetary policy and asset prices
is too narrow. A more fruitful debate on appropriate monetary policy reactions to developments on financial markets
would be possible if the focus were redirected from financial bubbles to the issue of procyclicality.”
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sell assets which drives their prices down. This puts further pressure on their capital base, creating
a feedback loop of deleveraging and fire sales.4 Financial cycles could also be aggravated by adverse
incentives. Farhi and Tirole (2009) show that it is rational for all financial intermediaries to choose a
risky business model with a high degree of leverage and an aggressive maturity transformation, if their
exposure to liquidity risk is highly correlated. This is due to the fact that the materialization of highly
correlated exposures for the whole banking system creates a systemic event, thereby forcing the central
bank to step in with liquidity injections, which in turn eliminates a lion’s share of the downside risk.
2.3 Are financial investors behaving non-rational?
It is important to stress that the new line of research summarized above does not consider financial market
agents to be non-rational. Nor is it necessary to make stark assumptions such as cyclical developments of
risk preferences. Adrian et al. (2010) argue that an outsider looking at the patterns of financial market
activity might be tempted to reach such conclusions. However, they emphasize that the driving force
of financial procyclicality is not a shift in fundamental preferences but rather an outcome of several
frictions, e.g. sticky leverage targets and procyclical risk management methodologies. They come into
place as soon as, for whatever reason, interest rates and/or asset prices change. They indeed affect the
risk appetite as an important force in determining risk premia, but this has to be distinguished from the
more fundamental concept of risk aversion. We rather think of these frictions as a behavior which can
be regarded as bounded rationality in the sense of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). For instance, risk
management techniques such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and internal rating approaches can be regarded as
biased heuristics in a complex world, which have obvious methodological drawbacks but which deliver an
acceptable performance under usual circumstances. Hence, we believe that models with heterogeneous
agents acting under bounded rationality are a reasonable alternative to model financial cycles and their
stylized facts.5
3 The Model Set-up
In this section, we describe our modeling strategy. Our model consists of two submodels. One describes
an extended behavioral macroeconomic model. The other one provides the law of motion and dynamics of
the financial market. We take the existence of heterogeneous agents and bounded rationality seriously in
4 Fire sales according to Shleifer and Vishny (2011) can be understood as a process where simultaneously finance-
constrained investors face the urgent need to sell off assets, (or the inability to buy them respectively) which finally
leads to a depression of asset prices below their fundamental values. Usually, this is supplemented by sharply rising
collateral rates. See Brunnermeier (2009) for an insightful description of these mechanisms during the current financial
crisis.
5 See Hommes (2006) for an insightful survey.
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the spirit of an adaptive belief system (ABS, Brock and Hommes, 1997, 1998). For our purpose, the ABS
implies that (i) the population of agents differ in the real and financial markets (ii) agents do not possess
a full information set nor full knowledge of the economy, nor adequate information processing capacities
in order to form rational expectations (iii) in each market, agents interact through an evolutionary
strategy switching process. Each agent uses an heuristic that guides her behavior and her forecasting
rule. Moreover, following Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010), we assume that the frequency of trading on
the financial market is higher than the frequency of transactions taken place in the goods market. Agents
of the real sector, therefore, are not able to engage in high frequency trading; nor are financial market
participants in the position to be actively engaged in goods markets transactions. Financial agents can
be best seen through the lense of institutional investors allocating wealth of ultimate savers.
However, what all agents have in common is that they use simple heuristic rules to make forecasts
of the relevant state variables. The population of agents endogenously chooses among those rules that
forecast best in the past. Since agents use different heuristics, the expectation formation is heterogeneous.
3.1 The Macroeconomic Model
The macroeconomic model resembles the three-equation representation of the New-Consensus model
economy where output dynamics are described by an aggregate demand equation, inflation dynamics by
an aggregate supply equation and monetary policy is conducted according to an interest rate reaction
function (Allsopp and Vines, 2000; Woodford, 2003; Goodfriend, 2007).
We part with the paradigm of starting from the ‘top-down’ perspective, where agents fully understand
the complexity of the system; instead, we apply the ‘bottom-up’ approach where agents are incapable to
understand the system as a whole (De Grauwe, 2010; DeGrauwe, 2011).
The output gap is specified in the reduced-form way
xq = a1E˜q[xq+1] + (1− a1)xq−1 − a2(iq − E˜q[piq+1] + ζq) + uq (1)
where xq is the output gap which depends on its own forward-looking expectation, denoted by E˜q[xq+1],
on its own lag, xq−1, on the ex-ante risky real interest rate, iq − E˜q[piq+1] + ζq and on a disturbance term
uq.
6 In this respect, the short-term nominal policy rate is denoted by iq.
Compared to the reduced-form representation of the prototype New-Keynesian aggregate demand
equation, two modeling issues are fundamentally distinct. Firstly, despite being in their nature forward-
6 For example, small New-Keynesian models with both leads and lags are Clarida et al. (1999); Cho and Moreno (2006).
Typically, the ex-ante real interest rate enters the demand function through the consumption Euler relation and the
lag term is derived from some form of habit formation in the consumption process of the representative household
(Fuhrer, 2000; Woodford, 2003).
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looking, expectations in this model specification are non-rational (denoted by the tilde above the expec-
tations operator). Expectations on the future output gap and expected inflation, E˜q[piq+1], are build as
the average forecast of a set of heterogeneous agents applying different heuristic forecasting rules (more
on that later).
Secondly, we allow for a modified financial propagation effect following the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy transmission (Borio and Zhu, 2008). Instead of using the financial accelerator model
of Bernanke et al. (1999) which has recently been applied to the New-Keynesian model economy by
Castelnuovo and Nistico (2011), in our model, financial market activity affects real outcomes by the risk
taking capacity of financial agents. As already sketched out, Adrian and Shin (2009b) and Adrian et al.
(2010) highlight the close relationship between rapid growth of financial actors’ balance sheets, lower
risk premia, and higher real activity. We implement this channel in the aggregate demand equation by
introducing a risky real interest rate that determines the output gap. It is defined as rrq = iq−E˜q[piq+1]+ζq
with ζq describing the spread between the riskless and the risky ex-ante real interest rate. The risk
premium, in turn, depends on the risk appetite of the financial sector and on macroeconomic conditions;
the latter imbed lagged variables of output and policy rate dynamics. Risk appetite is determined in the
financial market; a complete characterization of the risk premium is, thus, given in Section (3.2).
Inflation dynamics are specified by a conventional hybrid New-Keynesian Philips curve with inflation
piq being influenced by its own lead and lag, by the current output gap as well as a disturbance term
vq.
7 Again, expectations are non-rational; they denote the average forecast of the projections of the
population of heterogeneous agents.
piq = b1E˜q[piq+1] + (1− b1)piq−1 + b2xq + vq (2)
Finally, the model is closed by a standard interest-rate reaction function for the short-term nominal
policy rate with monetary policy reacting to the current inflation gap (piq − pi∗q ) and to the output gap.
Here, the central bank’s inflation target is denoted by pi∗q . Moreover, monetary policy has the degree of
freedom to respond to an additional set of variables (denoted by the vector χq). These variables may
reflect financial market or other policy-relevant dynamics. As will be discussed later on, there might arise
a rationale for monetary policy to directly address the emergence of financial cycles.
iq = c1iq−1 + (1− c1)[c2(piq − pi∗q ) + c3xq + c>4 χq] + wq (3)
7 For a review of price-setting equations, the reader is referred to Mankiw and Reis (2010).
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Market forecasts of the macro state variables are derived from simple heuristic rules. Agents perma-
nently update their forecasting rules in order to make optimal forecasts by means of minimizing forecast
errors.8 In this respect, following Brock and Hommes (1997); Branch and Evans (2011), this ‘learning’
mechanism is generated by switching between a pre-defined set of forecasting rules which perform best
in the recent and past market environment. Despite the use of biased forecasts, agents act rational as
they rank their forecasting models in accordance with their mean squared error (MSE).9 We assume
that agents forecast the set of macroeconomic variables yq+1 = (xq+1, piq+1) by pre-specified forecasting
rules gi,jq with j = {x, pi} and i denoting the number of forecasting rules. Notice that these rules are
exogenously fixed in the model, thereby reflecting bounded rationality. In its general form, the market
forecast for a state variable, i.e. the market state of belief, can be derived as the first moment of the
aggregate distribution of individual beliefs. It holds that E˜qyq+1 = N
−1∑N
i=1 g
i
q (Kurz, 2011).
Output forecasts. We apply two types of forecasting rules, that shape agents’ individual market belief
gi,xq with i = {f, ad}. The first rule is labeled the fundamentalist rule where agents estimate, eventually
by good luck, the steady state value of the output gap which is normalized to zero (see also on this
account DeGrauwe, 2011). The second rule is associated with adaptive expectations where agents form
expectations about the output gap in period t + q based on the realized output gap of period q − 1. It
holds that
gf,xq : E˜
f
q [xq+1] = 0 (4)
gad,xq : E˜
ad
q [xq+1] = xq−1. (5)
Inflation forecasts. Forecasts for the inflation outlook are produced in a similar vein with two fore-
casting rules; the first rule, again, is a fundamentalist rule that captures agents’ belief in monetary
policy credibility; it relies on the central bank’s announced inflation target pi∗q where the inflation target
is normalized to zero. The second rule belongs to the adaptive forecast according to which inflation
expectations are built upon realized inflation. The rules are written as
gf,piq : E˜
f
q [piq+1] = pi
∗
q (6)
gad,piq : E˜
ad
q [piq+1] = piq−1. (7)
8 Unpublished work by Lengnick and Wohltmann (2011) is using the same forecast rules. As we do, they rely on the work
of De Grauwe (2010) and DeGrauwe (2011). We consequently obtain similar macro setups. However, the interaction
channels between financial market and real economy differs substantially.
9 For a methodological discussion on the different concepts of rational expectations, rational beliefs, diverse beliefs and
the presence of private vs. public information, the reader is referred to Kurz (2011).
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Agents choose from this set of different beliefs/rules for future macroeconomic variables. This predic-
tor selection depends on the fitness and performance measures based on the MSE of the forecasting rules.
The utility, as measured by the sequence of MSEs, of applying one of the forecasting rules is specified as
U i,jq = −
∞∑
k=1
ωk
[
yj,q−k − E˜iq−k−1]2 (8)
where ωk are geometric declining weights (De Grauwe, 2010). The weights attached to the MSEs over
time decline with the effect that the most recent forecast errors exhibit a greater impact on utility than
errors made in the distant past. According to discrete choice theory, the proportion (and probability) of
agents choosing one of the two forecasting rules for the expected output gap and inflation is determined
by a multinormal logit distribution of the form
αi,jq =
exp(γU i,jq )
exp(γUf,jq ) + exp(γU
ad,j
q )
. (9)
The agent’s individual belief represents a random draw with Pr[gi,jq = f, j] = α
f,j
q and it holds that
αf,jq + α
ad,j
q = 1 for j = x, pi. Consequently, the market forecast (belief) is the pair of the proportions
with
E˜q[xq+1] = α
f,x
q E˜
f
q [xq+1] + α
ad,x
q E˜
ad
q [xq+1] with α
f,x
q + α
ad,x
q = 1 (10)
E˜q[piq+1] = α
f,pi
q E˜
f
q [piq+1] + α
ad,pi
q E˜
ad
q [piq+1] with α
f,pi
q + α
ad,pi
q = 1. (11)
As highlighted by Kurz (2011), such a model specification allows for diverse beliefs according to the
forecast classes. Within each class, agents are identical; across classes their expectations diverge.
Equation (9) describes the choice for a forecasting rule. Consider the case of i = ad and j = pi. With
increased utility (and therefore greater fitness) of inflation forecasts based on adaptive expectations, the
share of agents selecting the rule gad,piq increases. In this respect, the parameter γ is the intensity of
choice. It measures how fast agents switch between different forecast strategies. If the intensity of choice
approaches infinity, the entire population applies that forecasting rule that performs best over the time
horizon. In contrast, if γ is set to zero, the choice for a prediction strategy is entirely stochastic implying
that agents distribute themselves evenly across the set of strategies. Then, the probabilities of forecasting
inflation and output according to the fundamental and adaptive rule each take on values of exactly 0.5.
9
3.2 The Financial Market Model
In order to guarantee consistency of modeling the economy, we likewise apply the agent-based approach
to the financial market. Work on agent-based financial models shares in common that the presence of
heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents triggers complex and adaptive endogenous dynamics arising
from non-linearities in the financial market (Brock and Hommes, 1998; Hommes, 2006; LeBaron, 2006).
In our model, the financial market is populated by interacting agents trading a representative real asset;
its gross price is denoted with St. Agents are supposed to align their physical asset orders in accordance
to expected asset price changes (Westerhoff, 2008; Lengnick and Wohltmann, 2010). Moreover, we assume
that the fraction of agents following an adaptive trading strategy is balance sheet constrained implying
that leveraged asset purchases may provoke asset price reversals in the case the constraint becomes
binding (Thurner et al., 2010).
We start by describing the heuristic trading rules agents are equipped with in order to predict the
future asset price. In general, these rules rely on a mispricing signal upon which agents base their positive
or negative asset demand, where negative asset demand corresponds to selling assets in the market.
Noise traders: The first forecasting rule is based on the concept of noise where investors base their
asset demand simply on a white noise process. Economic news and past information on asset price
dynamics do not play a role at all.10 The expected asset price change is calculated as
gNt : E
N
t [St+1 − St] = kN [Nt ] (12)
where kN denotes the strength of the influence of the noise term on the expected price change. Since
the expected price development is positively related to the order demand, the demand function of agents
pursuing a noise strategy can be written as
DNt = lE
N
t [St+1 − St] = aNt with a = lkN . (13)
The parameter l is a positive reaction parameter mirroring the aggressiveness of the trading strategy.
Fundamental traders: Within this class, agents expect that the asset price may diverge from its
fundamental value Ft but the misalignment is going to be corrected with the market price converging to
its long-run, fundamental value. The mispricing signal governs the expected price change according to
gFt : E
F
t [St+1 − St] = kF [Ft − St]. (14)
10 Alternatively, the existence of noise traders in the market can be justified by limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). For a more general perspective on various aspects derived from behavioral finance, in particular on the effects
of market psychology for market dynamics, the reader is referred to Barberis and Thaler (2003).
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Notice that Ft denotes the perceived fundamental value on part of the fundamentalist. It does not need to
be equal to the true fundamental value F¯ (for the difference see Section (3.3), and in particular Lengnick
and Wohltmann (2010)). The order demand then follows
DFt = lE
F
t [St+1 − St] = b(Ft − St) + Ft with b = lkF (15)
where a noise term is added to the demand equation. A fundamental trading rule implies that order
demand is positive whenever the fundamental value of the asset exceeds the current market value. Con-
versely, asset demand becomes negative if fundamentalists perceive the asset price to be over valued.
Momentum traders: Agents rely on technical analysis trying to extrapolate observed price patterns.
There are various specifications to apply technical analysis; we rely on a trend-following strategy of the
form
gMt : E
M
t [St+1 − St] = kM [St − St−1] (16)
where the memory factor is characterized by only one lag. Again, order demand can be expressed as
DMt = lE
M
t [St+1 − St] = c(St − St−1) + Mt with c = lkM (17)
with the most recent past price trend being extrapolated. A random term, Mt , is added to the asset
demand to account for a variety of possible momentum strategies that are not captured by the simple
form used here (Westerhoff, 2008).
Agents choose between the specified strategies gzt with z = {N,F,M} according to the corresponding
fitness. In this respect, the attractiveness of a strategy is determined by a performance measure that
calculates the realized profits of trading rule z
Azt = (St − St−1)Dzt−2 + gAzt−1. (18)
The higher the weighted average of realized profits, the higher the attractiveness of the trading rule.
This can be modeled by two components. The first component of Equation (18) reflects the profit of
orders which are submitted in period t− 2. The profit is evaluated with a lag of one period. The second
component captures the memory factor g which measures how fast the attractiveness is discounted for
strategy selection.
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Like in the macroeconomic model, discrete choice theory gives an answer how beliefs are updated over
time and how the proportions of agents using one of the pre-defined trading rules evolve. It holds that
W zt =
exp(eAzt )
exp(eANt ) + exp(eA
F
t ) + exp(eA
M
t )
. (19)
Again, the fractions W zt add up to 1 and e is the intensity of choice parameter.
The price adjustment process is modeled as a price-impact function where the quantity of physical
excess demands (Dzt ) are related to the price change. The price function is given by
St+1 = St + d{
3∑
z=1
W zt D
z
t } (20)
with prices adjusted according to observed excess demand (Kyle, 1985). The parameter d measures the
adjustment speed how fast excess demands are translated by the market maker setting the price.11
Balance sheet constraint of the momentum trader : We model the chartist to be balance-sheet con-
strained. This restriction allows us to draw implications of asset price dynamics when the balance-sheet
constraint is hit. As will be shown in Section (4), the modeling specification generates pronounced non-
linear price movements. In order to keep model dynamics tractable, we let the constraint bind only for the
proportion of agents following the momentum strategy.12 This is important because if we let the funda-
mentalists be likewise constrained in leveraged asset purchases, they may have not enough balance-sheet
capacity to generate asset orders that push the asset price back towards its fundamental value.
In what follows, we apply the market environment of Thurner et al. (2010) who model leveraged asset
purchases for a multi-agent hedge fund market with value investors. The fraction of momentum traders
is equipped with an initial cash position C0 that is equal to their capital position. Most generally, asset
purchases are financed by cash or by loans leading to a negative cash position; the total amount of loans
outstanding is calculated as Lt = max[−Ct, 0]. The asset side is written as the identity
Wt = StNt + Ct (21)
11 Notice that our price impact function is based on the gross asset price St. Market maker models with the gross price
are specified in Kyle (1985); Day and Huang (1990); Chiarella (1992). In these models, “the market maker mediates
transactions on the market out of equilibrium by providing liquidity” (Hommes, 2006:1135). The market maker services
excess demand by supplying stock out of his inventory (et vice verse when there is excess supply). In contrast, the
literature we rely on to build the financial market model usually takes a log-linear approximation of the market maker’s
price formation rule. Then, the price impact function refers to the log price (Farmer and Joshi, 2002; Westerhoff, 2008;
Lengnick and Wohltmann, 2010).
12 To be clear, in reality, agents are not able to instantaneously switch between a fundamentalist strategy and a leveraged
strategy in the presence of funding constraints. However, in our model, we can still rely on this switching mechanism
by making the assumption that changing weights in the population likewise reflects reallocations of funds by ultimate
savers to those agents that turn out to be most successful in terms of profits in the recent past.
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where Nt represent the total amount of the asset hold on the balance sheet. Therefore, the laws of motion
for asset holdings and the cash position are
Nt = Nt−1 +DMt (22)
Ct = Ct−1 − (Nt −Nt−1)St. (23)
Our leverage ratio is given by
λt =
StNt
StNt + Ct
. (24)
Notice that the ratio changes due to (i) a pure valuation effect, i.e. an increase in the asset price and (ii)
a balance sheet expansion/contraction through asset purchases/sales and a corresponding change in the
cash or loan amount.13
Momentum traders are required to maintain a maximum permitted threshold λmaxt . One can think of
this threshold as either (i) fixed by funding suppliers (which we do not explicitly model here) or (ii) fixed
by a regulatory agency. Moreover, maximum leverage can be pure exogenous to the market environment
or it can be adjusted endogenously to market conditions. The insights of macroprudential regulation
indicate that it is advantageous for policymakers to apply time-varying instruments conditioned on market
dynamics (Borio, 2010). Therefore, the endogeneity is achieved by allowing the maximum leverage to
increase in times of low market volatility. In contrast, maximum permitted leverage decreases when asset
volatility picks up speed. It holds that
λmaxt = max
[
1,
λmax
1 + %σ2,St
]
(25)
where σ2,St measures the variance of the asset price over an observation period of τ time steps. The
parameter % is the strength of response by the regulator when volatility changes.
In order to reveal the implications of balance sheet effects of momentum traders, we set up a coordi-
nation game between the ’balance sheet risk manager’ and the ’trading strategist’. The risk manager’s
task is to permanently evaluate the balance sheet position on a mark-to-market basis in order to ensure
that the maximum permitted leverage is not exceeded. The trading strategist has the aim of buying or
selling the asset on the basis of the mispricing signal she receives. The coordination can best described
by a sequence of actions to be taken within one period.
13 A small drawback of this measure is its somewhat unintuitive behavior if the cash position is positive. A rising asset
price and the associated positive valuation effect lead to an increase of the leverage ratio which is at odds with basic
balance sheet arithmetics. With a negative cash position, the ratio behaves correctly.
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At the beginning of period t, the risk manager arrives with the following asset position from the
’evening’ of the previous period t− 1:
Wt−1 = Nt−1St−1 + Ct−1. (26)
When starting her trading portal, the risk manager observes the new traded price St.
At the same time, the trading desk opens with traders likewise observing the new price St upon which
the trading strategy is based upon. In particular, following the momentum strategy, the trader articulates
the additional physical asset demand Naddt for the current day t based on the observed price St. She
communicates the desired volume of additional physical asset demand to the accountant.
The risk manager calculates the new desired balance sheet position which involves (i) considering the
desired asset demand of the trader and (ii) valuing total desired asset holdings (holdings of the previous
period Nt−1 plus the desired asset demand Naddt ) marked-to-market at the observed asset price St.
Wt = Nt−1St +Naddt St + Ct
Wt = NtSt + Ct (27)
with
NtSt = (Nt−1 +Naddt )St (28)
Ct = Ct−1 −Naddt St. (29)
In a next step, the risk manager needs to calculate the leverage ratio based on the desired balance sheet:
λt =
NtSt
NtSt + Ct
. (30)
Now, the she compares the desired leverage λt with the maximum permitted leverage λ
max
t .
If λt does not exceed λ
max
t , then there is leeway to leverage up and asset demand is realized according
to the trading rule DMt . The balance sheet is set up according to Equation (27) at the end of period t
(evening).
If λt exceeds λ
max
t , the accountant must calculate the required amount of asset demand to restore
λmaxt . She then submits a binding command to generate exactly the asset demand by the trader.
14
14 A situation may arise where a very strong positive mispricing signal leads to a large desired additional demand of the
trading strategist. It is now however possible that the risk manager refuses to confirm the order in its entire amount,
since a very large amount of credit-financed additional demand might produce a violation of the leverage constraint.
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The required amount of additional physical asset demand qt in case of the binding constraint can be
calculated by the balance sheet identity.
λmaxt =
NtSt
NtSt + Ct
λmaxt =
Nt−1St + qtSt
Nt−1St + qtSt + Ct−1 − qtSt
λmaxt (Nt−1St + qtSt + Ct−1 − qtSt) = Nt−1St + qtSt
qt = Nt−1(λmaxt − 1) + λmaxt
Ct−1
St
. (31)
Therefore, if the asset price falls, Equation (31) predicts that qt becomes negative for a negative cash
position, i.e. a positive amount of outstanding loans, and becomes even more negative with a higher
λmaxt .
Finally, we allow for the possibility of default on part of the class of momentum traders. Whenever
the valuation effect leads to a negative net worth position with Wt < 0, we model a stylized default.
Momentum traders are removed from the market with the effect that their proportion WMt shrinks to
zero and they are reintroduced in the next period with the initial cash position C0.
3.3 Market Interconnections, the Risk Premium and Solving the Model
Like in Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010), both submodels operate on different time scales. The financial
market model is supposed to be set up on a daily basis t; whereas the macroeconomic model exhibits
a quarterly frequency q; quarter q is assumed to contain 64 trading days. Each variable derived from
the financial market model is transferred to the quarterly model by simple taking the mean of the daily
realizations for one quarter. For instance, for the quarterly asset price, it holds that
Sq =
1
64
64q∑
t=64(q−1)+1
St. (32)
The question is now how both models are interconnected to each other. The macroeconomic model
affects the financial market in terms of the perceived fundamental price Ft. Although the true, steady
state fundamental value F¯t is a constant, trader’s perception about the fundamental value depends on
the most recent real activity, i.e. the output gap. It holds that
Ft = h exp (xq) for t = 64(q − 1) + 1 : 64q. (33)
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In our model, the perceived fundamental price diverges from the true fundamental value for a number
of reasons. According to the no-arbitrage pricing theory, an asset’s price reflects expectations about the
future underlying payments generated by the asset, discounted to the present. The discount factors, in
turn, are determined by the future path of interest rates with the relevant maturities augmented by a
risk premia compensation whose size depends on the riskiness of the respective asset Cochrane (2001).
Due to the presence of bounded rationality, we assume that agents are not equipped with the objective
probability distributions of future cash flow streams and the path of discount rates. Therefore, agents
try to approximate the fundamental value by the recent real activity.
The dynamics within the financial market flip back to the real economy by the presence of the macro
risk premium ζq that enters the aggregate demand equation. Motivated by the insights of the risk-taking
channel and the interplay of asset price, balance sheet as well as leverage dynamics, our macro risk
premium reflects the degree of expansion in the financial market. As Adrian et al. (2010) make clear,
risk appetite highlights both (i) the constraint in the financial sector and (ii) preferences of agents who
actively trade in the market. In their model, active management of balance sheets by means of meeting a
target Value-at-Risk (VaR) triggers portfolio choices that lead to fluctuations in the market price of risk
in the economy.
From an asset pricing perspective, the risk premium on a specific asset is composed of two components,
i.e. the quantity of risk and the market price of risk. The quantity of risk describes the covariation
between the stochastic discount factor and the expected return on the asset; whereas the market price of
risk measures the required risk compensation per unit of risk; it is the same for all assets and equals the
reciprocal of agents’ risk appetite. Overall risk appetite depends on agents’ reluctance towards uncertain
outcomes and the level of aggregate, non-diversifiable, macroeconomic uncertainty. The latter typically
relies on the macroeconomic environment and moves periodically in response to macroeconomic factors
(Gai and Vause, 2006). For our modeling purposes, we model the risk premium, i.e. the credit spread,
as a linear combination of both financial market and macroeconomic variables
ζq = m1∆sq +m2xq +m3iq +m4σ
2,x
q +m5σ
2,pi
q +m6σ
2,i
q . (34)
The balance sheet expansion of the financial sector and hence its risk appetite is measured by the change in
the (log-) asset price between two quarters. This change reflects both the heterogeneous trading strategies
of the population of agents and the possibility that the leverage constraint of the momentum traders binds.
The endogeneity of trading weights and the existence of an adaptive trading strategy generates a positive
feedback loop of rising asset prices and amplifying fluctuations in the real economy. If there is a strong
expansion of financial market activity, this should be reflected in higher asset price growth. However,
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if the leverage constraint is hit due to valuation effects and momentum traders are forced to de-lever,
asset demand plumps and the credit spread increases. Risk appetite, thus, determines the macro risk
premium of the economy. Like in Adrian et al. (2010), changes to risk appetite are not triggered by
varying risk preferences, but the apparent change emanates from the strength of trading and the leverage
constraint.15 To account for other aspects of the risk-taking channel, we allow for lagged values of the
output gap and the interest rate to enter the risk premium equations. In particular, Gambacorta (2009)
has shown that a lower level of the policy rate induces increased risk-taking which manifests itself in a
compression of required risk compensation. Finally, overall macroeconomic uncertainty as measured by
the volatility of the output gap, the inflation rate and the policy rate affects the macro risk premium.
To provide the laws of motion for the macroeconomic variables, the model is solved by first writing
the model equations in a structural matrix form. With the coefficient matrices appropriately chosen, the
model takes the form of
ΞXq = Ω¯E˜qXq+1 + Ψ¯Xq−1 + Λ¯εq (35)
where the variable vector Xq consists of Xq = [xq, piq, iq, ζq]
>. Macro shocks, the (log-) asset price and
the volatility measures are stacked into the vector εq = [u, v, w,∆sq, σ
2,x
q , σ
2,pi
q ]
>. These variables are
purely exogenous to the endogenous state variables of the quarterly model. The reduced-form solution is
then given as
Xq = ΩE˜qXq+1 + ΨXq−1 + Λεq (36)
with Ω = Ξ−1Ω¯,Ψ = Ξ−1Ψ¯,Λ = Ξ−1Λ¯
4 Simulation Dynamics
4.1 The Benchmark Simulation
The implications of the model dynamics can be revealed when calibrating the model to fit basic moments
and cross-correlations of state variables. As emphasized by Hommes and Wagener (2009), an important
problem arises within the behavioral approach due the presence of the many degrees of freedom. Het-
erogeneity in expectations formation inevitable increases the number of parameters which need to be
15 To make the point clear, in our model, risk preferences (risk aversion) of agents remain constant as measured by the
aggressiveness parameters of the trading rules. However, when the population of momentum traders dominates the
market, strong momentum of the asset price generates the positive feedback loop that spills over to the real economy.
In so far, the time-varying weights of traders reflect changes in the measured aggregate risk appetite.
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Table 1: Parameter Calibration
Calibration Values
macro model financial market model
a1 0.5 k
N 0.04 m3 0.01
a2 0.2 k
F 0.04 m4 0.2
b1 0.5 k
M 0.08 m5 0.2
b2 0.05 l 1.0 σ
N 0.01
c1 0.5 g 0.975 σ
F 0.01
c2 1.5 e 300 σ
M 0.05
c3 0.5 d 1.0
c>4 0N×1 % 0
ρ 0.5 λmax 10
γ 10000 m1 -0.5
σx,pi,i 0.005 m2 -0.01
quantified. However, in our opinion, the insights of this modeling strategy by allowing diverging expec-
tations to be a major source of business and financial cycle fluctuations outweighs the obvious drawback
of restricting the parameter set a-priori and somewhat ad-hoc. Since our macroeconomics model mainly
relies on the work of De Grauwe (2010); DeGrauwe (2011), except the macro risk premium, and the finan-
cial market follows partly the line of Westerhoff (2008), we stick to their parameter calibration whenever
possible.
Table (1) reports the calibration for the benchmark simulation; the parameter values of the macroe-
conomic model are those typically found in reduced-form New-Keynesian model estimates as in (Clarida
et al., 1999; Cho and Moreno, 2006). The financial market model is calibrated to fit basic properties of
empirical financial times series data; they include period of booms and busts. Moreover, the benchmark
simulation is conducted with the specification that the it entails an exogenous leverage constraint with
% = 0. The maximum permitted leverage λmaxt is set at a constant value with the consequence that most
recent financial market conditions do not enter the leverage constraint. Moreover, it is assumed that
monetary policy follows a conventional Taylor-type interest-rate reaction function with positive reactions
coefficients for the inflation gap and output gap.
Figure (1) shows one ‘prototype’ simulation with one sequence of random draws for the stochastic
shocks. The time period covers 200 quarters or 12800 days, respectively. It covers the time series dynamics
for the output gap, inflation and the asset price as well as the degree of heterogeneity of agents prevailing
in the goods and financial market. The sub-figures of the macro variables are quarterly; whereas asset
price movements are depicted as the daily realizations of trading activity scaled to the quarterly abscissa.
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Figure 1: Baseline Simulation
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First of all, what appears eye-catching is the strong cyclical behavior of the output gap and inflation
for the simulation period. In particular, between quarter 85 and 110, output persistently is below its
steady value. The same holds for the inflation rate which deviates from the target for a prolonged
period of time. The sub-figures below the output gap and the inflation figures display the corresponding
proportion of agents following either the fundamentalist or the adaptive forecasting strategy for building
output and inflation expectations. In this respect, the black areas denote the proportion of agents who
use the concept of adaptive expectations formation. It becomes clear that in those states of the economy
that are dominated by type gad,xq -agents, the output gap becomes either positive or negative. In turn, the
latter depends on the market environment whether there are optimistic or pessimistic views on the future
path of the output gap. What is striking is the existence of a reinforcement learning process of boundedly
rational agents throughout the course of the business cycle. Agents switch to the forecasting strategy that
performed best in the recent past (Hommes and Wagener, 2009; De Grauwe, 2010). Expectations now
become self-fulfilling in the sense that a small sequence of random shocks or one single large shock to the
endogenous state variables in one direction makes it attractive to switch to the adaptive rule. The more
agents rely on this rule, the more likely the output gap or inflation moves in exactly the same direction,
thereby strengthening cyclical fluctuations. The business cycle then becomes increasingly expectations
driven and it is the outcome of endogenous waves of different kinds of expectations formations. For
agents permanently searching for the optimal forecasting rule, a reduction of the macro risk premium by
means of a financial market expansion can just represent a market scenario that induces them to switch
to the gad,xq , g
ad,pi
q -rules. Consequently, even if the macro risk premium has already adjusted towards
its fundamental value, macroeconomic expectations continue to push output and inflation away from
their steady state values. This holds particularly for the inflation rate where the size of the output gap
movements and the exogenous supply shock are not sufficient to initiate a negative feedback effect that
allows for an endogenously changing share of inflation expectations in favor of the perceived inflation
target pi∗q .
Turning to the financial market, the presence of heterogeneous traders likewise matters for booms
and busts in the representative asset price. Whenever momentum traders, denoted by the black-shaded
area, dominate the market, the asset price decouples from its fundamental value.16 For instance, around
quarter 80, the asset price dynamic can be clearly interpreted as a boom period before it crashes back
to its fundamental value. The evolutionary switching between the two trading strategies produces these
‘speculative’ bubbles. What is worth mentioning is the fact that their existence is the result of individual
rational choice rather than the outcome of pure irrational behavior. Agents in the financial market choose
16 For the sake of completeness, the sub-figure at the bottom of Figure (1) depicts the weights of momentum traders
(black), fundamentalists (gray) and noise traders (white).
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the strategy which maximizes their utilities being determined by gross profit flows and measured by their
fitness functions. In so far, from time to time, the asset price is driven by rational animal spirits (Brock
and Hommes, 1998). From a technical perspective, what is happening is that the occurrence of a small and
positive random shock of the uninformed noise trade pushes the asset price away from its fundamental.
If, by chance, the momentum trader realized a positive gross profit based on the latest asset demand,
the fitness function ensures that the fraction of momentum traders in the trading population increases
which results in a widening of the mispricing signal. As a consequence, a self-reinforcing asset price boom
occurs with the fundamental strategy not being strong enough to counteract momentum in the financial
market. The turning point is reached whenever a negative shock generated by the noise trader is strong
enough to let the asset price drop. Then, trading opportunities based on a bullish market are erased and
the momentum as well as the fundamental strategy pushes the price back to its fundamental value. In
the worst case, the falling asset price can make the momentum trader force to deleverage which produces
a highly non-linear asset price reaction and the possibility of default. The black triangles mark market
events in which momentum traders default on their assets with their asset demands becoming nil and
their net worth position approaching zero.
Most interestingly, our macro-finance model is capable of replicating stylized facts and statistical
properties of price and return dynamics of a variety of asset classes. They include (i) asset prices follow
a near unit root process with prices persistently being decoupled from fundamentals, (ii) returns are
not predictable with no autocorrelation, (iii) the distribution of asset returns display fat tails and (iv)
asset returns exhibit excess volatility and clustered volatility.17 This implies on the one hand that in
an arbitrage-free market, price changes, i.e. returns, exhibit essentially no correlation indicating to the
property that expected returns are not predictable under the risk-neutral measure (Singleton, 2006). On
the other hand, however, during some periods of time, it appears that high volatility events tend to
cluster in time; high price changes tend to be followed by high price changes (et vice versa).
Figure (2) plots the basic return characteristics of the asset. The upper sub-figures represent the log
returns and the squared log returns for the simulation exercise. As suspected, returns follow a random
walk character with hardly any predictable component for the underlying data-generating process. The
lower left figure shows the autocorrelation function of log returns; evidently, autocorrelations show no
significant fluctuations around zero. However, the return process is characterized by fat tail events:
a simple test on the probability distribution of returns clearly dismisses the assumption of a normal
distribution. More probability mass is located in the tails and in the center of the distribution as measured
17 See for an overview of stylized facts Mandelbrot (1963); Ding et al. (1983); Pagan (1986); Cont (2001).
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Figure 2: Return Distribution
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by excess kurtosis.18 When turning to squared returns, we can identify the existence of clustered volatility
as measured by the autocorrelations of squared returns for the simulation run. They are positive and
exhibit a high degree persistence for a prolonged period of time. Finally, to shed light on the sources
of these observations, the lower right sub-figure shows a scatter plot for log returns in the dimension
size of returns and the weight of momentum traders in the market. There is a clear concentration of
returns around +− 0.05 for momentum weights between 10% and 60%. Weights between 60% and 90%
are associated with returns with the same size, but with a much lower frequency. Only if the market
essentially is dominated by momentum traders, returns blow up in either one direction. The fact that
weights between 60% and 90% are less frequent comes from the non-linearity of the reinforcement process.
Whenever momentum picks up speed, the fraction of agents applying the gMt -rule increases almost by a
jump process.19 All in all, the endogeneity of switching between forecasting rules produces the observation
of clustered volatility and fat tail outcomes.20
Whether non-fundamental asset price movements, de-leveraging processes and default events spill over
to the real economy via the macro risk premium mostly depends on the current macroeconomic condition
itself. In times of optimistic expectations concerning the future output gap, negative shocks from the
financial market are of minor importance, if at all. However, if output gap expectations are pessimistic,
contractive financial developments amplify pessimist views on the economy, thereby pushing the output
gap to even worse negative values. Due to the presence of endogenous expectations building on part of
the agents on both goods and financial market, the model is not capable to fully isolate the effect of
financial market activity on the real economy. Or to put it in on a nutshell, persistent and cyclical output
gap movements could be the outcome of either waves of adaptive macro expectations or financial market
developments or the combination of a self-reinforcing process of both components.21
18 Kurtosis κ is the fourth moment of a distribution and it measures how much of the variance is the result of infrequent
extreme deviations from the mean of the distribution. Here, the kurtosis takes on a value of κ = 17.8 which is clearly
higher than the kurtosis of a normal distribution with κn = 3.
19 Rational asset pricing models typically find it hard to replicate all the stylized facts. Only recently, some literature
has made progress to resolve the asset pricing anomalies. Time-variation in discount rates due to time-varying risk
aversion or time-varying aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty with changing conditional volatility and long run risks
are used as explanation attempts to resolve the puzzles (?Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2005; Bansal
and Shaliastovich, 2010). In a recent asset pricing survey, Cochrane (2011:28) makes the point that theories based on
behavioral finance and bounded rationality can be likewise explained within the discount rate approach where distorted
expectations are captured by the difference between the risk-neutral and the historical probabilities of asset prices. To
him, it is rather a convention with “[...] the line between recent ‘exotic preferences’ and ‘behavioral finance’ [being] so
blurred that it describes academic politics better than anything substantive.”
20 For the sake of competentness, various other model specifications based on agent-based modeling or based on the
existence of learning agents using Bayesian updating generate boom-bust dynamics with excess as well as clustered
volatility (Lux and Marchesi, 2000; Cont, 2007; Branch and Evans, 2010; Bansal and Shaliastovich, 2010; Adam and
Marcet, 2011).
21 In the model economy of Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010), these effects can be to some extent separated from each
other because they equip agents on the goods market with rational expectations.
23
4.2 Isolating Macro Impacts
This section further elaborates on the implications of the benchmark model specification. One decisive
distinction compared to the rational expectations paradigm is that for the same parameter calibration
setup, the responses of the endogenous state variable differ depending on the current market environment.
The latter, in turn, is determined by the weights of macro fundamentalists and adaptive agents as well as
the fraction of momentum, fundamental and noise traders. In order to isolate the effects of macroeconomic
shocks, we follow the procedure of Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010) of calculating the impulse responses
of selected macro and finance variables. In this respect, the model is simulated 2000 times for 2000
different realizations of the financial market random shocks; whereas the macro shocks are set equal to
zero. In each simulation run, we generate two model dynamics; the first by setting uq, vq, wq = 0 and the
second by setting the shocks likewise to zero except one particular macro shock that is supposed to take
on a value of one standard deviation at a particular time during the simulation process. Notice that the
random shocks associated to the financial market in each simulation are exactly the same. By calculating
the differences of the evolution of state variables between the two simulation runs, it becomes possible to
detect the isolated impact of macro shocks. It allows to analyze how a macroeconomic shock affects the
financial market and how resulting changes in asset price and leverage dynamics spill over again to the
real economy.
Figure (3) displays impulse responses for a negative policy rate shock, i.e. the central bank lowers its
rate by one standard deviation. The solid lines represent the mean responses of selected variables and the
dashed lines are the corresponding 95% quantiles. The model produces variable dynamics that are mostly
in line with stylized facts on business cycle dynamics (see for an empirical overview Taylor, 1995). A fall
in the policy rate is associated with a boost of aggregate demand as captured by a widening of the output
gap and an increase in inflation. In accordance with the risk-taking view, a fall in the short rate triggers
a fall in the macro risk premium which can be amplified by subsequent asset price dynamics following the
initial policy shock. However, the bandwidth of possible adjustments widely varies due to the presence of
market sentiment on the goods and financial market, even in the long-run, there remains a persistent effect
on the economy, particularly on the inflation rate. Inflation inertia is central in agent-based, behavioral
macro models; this has also been found by De Grauwe (2010). This becomes clear when observing the
95% quantiles outcomes of the state variables. For instance, the asset price can significantly rise with
the effect of compressing the macro risk premium further which produces exactly the procyclicality of
the system we are looking for. The state variables heavily depend on the initial market environment
concerning market expectations. Each simulation run with different random draws generates different
market expectations that have build up in the past. Consequently, there is some sort of path dependency
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Function to Interest Rate Shock
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in the evolution of the economy which can either act as a dampening effect on the macro shocks or it
can amplify shocks in terms of cyclical fluctuations and persistent deviations from the steady state. The
confidence intervals also confirm that the effectiveness of policy-rate changes on the financial market
heavily depend on market sentiment. High weights of trend-chasers and expectations extrapolators can
bring about a macro and finance response that is essentially ‘immune’ to unanticipated policy moves. As
the same should hold in case monetary policy raises its policy rate, interest-rate increases to fight asset
price bubbles might be ineffective - the proposition put forward by the proponents of the benign-neglect
view of how monetary policy should deal with asset price bubbles (Greenspan, 2002).
5 Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy
The exercise of the benchmark simulation pursues the aim of presenting the evolution of endogenous waves
of output expansion and contraction generated by market beliefs on both financial and goods markets.
In this section, we explore recent advances in both academia and policy institutions towards dealing
with procyclicality and financial market dynamics from a policy perspective. As already illustrated in
Equation (3), monetary policy is implemented by the appropriate setting of the short-term policy rate.
Notice, however, that in this section, we allow monetary policy to react to the macro risk premium that
ensures a negative feedback between inflation and output as well as financial market dynamics. Such
reaction is not the outcome of an explicit financial stability objective. Monetary policy is yet advised
to change the conventional Taylor rule in response to a varying risk spread by a way of increasing the
policy rate whenever the spread shrinks (et vice versa). Such policy response is welfare-improving since
it acknowledges that the relevant interest rate is not only the risk-neutral part but it is also affected
by variations in the risk premium. Consequently, it is an optimal response in order to shield the goods
market from financial procyclicality for the purpose of stabilizing inflation and output.22 The reaction
parameter χq is, thus, equal to ζq.
Ultimately, macroprudential policy has the aim of addressing the systemic risk component in financial
markets and the possible associated real disruptions. It includes (i) a time dimension, i.e. the evolution of
risk over time and its implications for procyclicality and amplification effects of the financial system, and
(ii) a cross-section dimension that describes the interlinkages between financial agents, how aggregate
common risk is distributed among them and how this common source of risk makes them vulnerable
to joint failures (Borio, 2010; Geiger, 2011). In our model, procyclicality is most pronounced when
momentum trades follow their trading strategy without bounds in a self-fulfilling way and with a positive
22 For a theoretical and rule-based explanation of this result see McCulley and Toloui (2008); Taylor (2008); Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2009); Giavazzi and Giovannini (2010).
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feedback loop on asset price dynamics. The danger of non-linearities in the asset price and in the macro
risk premium are, thus, greater the higher is the fraction of momentum traders in the market. At the
same time, the more leveraged those trades are, the more likely is the presence of fire sales. Due to the
leverage constraint and marked-to-market valuation, traders are forced to sell the stock of assets which
can trigger a severe asset price bust with adverse effects on output. From a regulator perspective, the
objectives of minimizing financial and real procyclicality then is equivalent to minimizing volatility of the
asset price and the output gap. As already sketched out, the macroprudential regulator tries to achieve
this by varying the maximum permitted leverage inversely to the observed asset price volatility.
Figure (4) plots the standard deviations of the objective variables in the parameter space {c4, %}.
The parameter c4 captures the strength of the monetary policy reaction to the macro risk premium;
whereas the parameter % mirrors the macroprudential policy’s aggressiveness to asset price volatility. In
the respect, the lower abscissa draws the c4 space and the upper abscissa draws the % space. Notice
that the standard deviations are calculated as the outcome of a non-cooperative policy game implying
that monetary policy’s reaction function is altered taking macroprudential policy as completely inactive,
i.e. c4 = [−1, . . . , 0.2] and % = 0 (et vice versa with % = [200, . . . , 0] and c4 = 0).23 The values for the
unconditional second moments are the outcome of simulating the system for 100 different realizations of
the random generator with each simulation run consisting of 500 quarters.
With an increasing negative reaction to the macro risk premium, monetary policy is successful in
shielding output and inflation from financial procyclicality. The stronger the inverse policy response, the
lower are the macro standard deviations. At the same time, monetary policy indirectly may affect asset
price dynamics. A fall in the macro risk premium and an appropriate increase in the policy rate may
lead to changes in the perceived fundamental asset price such that pronounced asset price dynamics led
by trend-chasing strategy can be smoothed by increasing the mispricing signal on part of fundamental
traders so that actual asset price does not deviate too much from its fundamental value. However, this
part of monetary policy transmission in our model seems rather weak. Monetary policy is incapable of
changing asset price and leverage volatility by means of reacting to the macro risk premium. In contrast,
changing the maximum permitted leverage dependent on the current market environment is a powerful
instrument to stir asset price dynamics. As illustrated by the standard deviation of both the asset price
and leverage, macroprudential policy can dampen financial procyclicality without increasing the standard
deviations of the macro variables. Indeed, it supports stabilizing inflation and output though the macro
effects are less pronounced than an adequate monetary policy reaction. Turning to the policy instruments,
23 The choice for the parameter space for c4 comes from the observation, that with c4 > 0, monetary policy itself generates
positive feedback between the real economy and the financial market. For a sufficiently large value of c4, a generalized
Taylor principle does not hold anymore so that the asset price as well as the other state variables explode.
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Figure 4: Standard Deviations of Policy Variables
Output gap Inflation
Asset price Interest rate
Leverage Maximum leverage
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it is clear that macroprudential policy increases its instrument volatility the more aggressively it reacts
to market conditions. This is shown by the convex pattern of the maximum permitted leverage when
plotting against %. What is worth mentioning, however, is that it enables monetary policy, on average, to
react less volatile by its short-rate instrument in order to stabilize inflation and output. In this respect,
macroprudential supports monetary policy. Monetary policy, itself, is faced with a U-shaped pattern
of interest-rate volatility when reacting to the macro risk premium. This comes from the fact that a
highly negative macro risk premium reaction generates sharp interest reversals; along similar lines, a
positive response to the risk premium leads to an amplification of macro procyclicality which requires
sharp interest rate responses in opposite direction in order to stabilize inflation and output.
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6 Conclusion
We constructed a model which integrates the real economy and the financial market. Our transmission
channel of financial market activity to the real sector embraces a recent strand of literature shedding light
on the link between the active balance sheet management of financial market participants, the induced
procyclical fluctuations of desired risk compensations and their final impact on the real economy. Our
financial market submodel generates pronounced boom-bust cycles and - mainly due to the presence of
leverage - we obtain episodes of highly non-linear asset price reversals triggered by simultaneous fire
sales. The cyclical behavior of the model has to be mainly attributed to the abandonment of the rational
expectation assumption. It might appear somewhat inconsistent that we assume bounded rationality.
We indeed stress that financial market behavior can be viewed as rational under certain severe frictions
instead of assuming wildly irrational agents. But the emerging patterns of asset prices and discount rates
might not look rational at all. In our view, this comes from important frictions such as limited time
horizons in risk management models, and sticky return and leverage targets. They might literally force
fundamentally rational agents to behave as if they were not - from an outsider’s perspective. So, the most
sophisticated research strategy would be to explicitly model frictions for financial market agents and to
construct a micro-founded general equilibrium model with endogenous financial procyclicality. But to our
knowledge, all of the attempts undertaken in this direction (i) do not capture yet the entire characteristics
of endogenous financial procyclicality and (ii) are restricted to a two-period setup and therefore unable to
produce macro time series e.g. for policy analysis.24 Hence, we believe it is a pragmatic and sufficiently
reasonable modeling strategy to assume bounded rationality on financial markets. This assumption
essentially serves as a ’proxy’ for the frictions which turn out to be very difficult to model. Furthermore,
the tractability of our setup allows as to generate simulated time series. Nevertheless, we acknowledge
that an explicit modeling of these mentioned frictions in a general equilibrium setup would be crucial for
a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the various feedback mechanisms and spillovers.
Concerning policy analysis, it becomes clear that a systematic and inverse central bank reaction to
changes of the macro risk premium is highly effective in shielding the real economy from boom and bust
episodes on the financial market. Macroprudential regulation in turn is well suited to smooth asset price
dynamics, since a countercyclical leverage regulation dampens debt-financed booms. However, we do
not formulate an optimal policy conclusion. It would be interesting to specify loss functions for both
the central bank and the macroprudential authority and to minimize them over the space of possible
parameter constellations, most likely with a numerical grid search. This procedure could also shed light
24 See for instance Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009), Gertler and Kioytaki (2010) and Phurichai and Rungcharoenkitkul
(2010).
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on the issue of optimal coordination between both policies. See Angelini et al. (2011) for an approach
heading in this direction. We leave this as a question for future research.
31
References
Adam, K. and A. Marcet (2011): “Booms and Busts in Asset Prices,” CEP Discussion Paper 1059,
Centre of Economic Performance.
Adrian, T., E. Moench, and H. S. Shin (2010): “Macro Risk Premium and Intermediary Balance
Sheet Quantities,” IMF Economic Review, 58, 179–207.
Adrian, T. and H. S. Shin (2009a): “Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy,” American Economic
Review, 99, 600–605.
——— (2009b): “Prices and Quantities in the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism,” International
Journal of Central Banking, 5, 131–142.
——— (2010): “Liquidity and leverage,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19, 418–437.
Allsopp, C. and D. Vines (2000): “The Assessment: Macroeconomic Policy,” Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 16, 1–32.
Angelini, P., S. Neri, and F. Panetta (2011): “Monetary and macroprudential policies,” Temi di
discussione (Economic working papers) 801, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.
Bansal, R. and I. Shaliastovich (2010): “Confidence Risk and Asset Prices,” American Economic
Review, 100, 537–41.
Bansal, R. and A. Yaron (2004): “Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset Pricing
Puzzles,” Journal of Finance, 59, 1481–1509.
Barberis, N. and R. Thaler (2003): “A Survey of Behavioral Finance,” in Handbook of the Economics
of Finance, ed. by G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. M. Stulz, Elsevier, vol. 1 of Handbook of the
Economics of Finance, chap. 18, 1053–1128.
Bean, C. e. a. (2010): “Monetary Policy after the Fall,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Annual
Conference Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
Bernanke, B. (2010): “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble,” Speech at the Annual Meeting of
the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia.
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (1989): “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations,”
American Economic Review, 79, 14–31.
——— (2000): “Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility,” NBER Working Papers 7559, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Bernanke, B. S. and M. Gertler (1995): “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary
Policy Transmission,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 27–48.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999): “The Financial Accelerator in a Quantita-
tive Business Cycle Framework,” in Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. by J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford,
Elsevier, vol. 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, chap. 21, 1341–1393.
BoE (2009): “The role of macroprudential policy,” Discussion paper.
Borio, C. (2010): “Implementing a Macroprudential Policy Framework: Balancing Boldness and Re-
alism,” Speech given at HKIMR-BIS conference - Financial Stability: Towards a Macroprudential
Approach, 5-6 July 2010, Bank for International Settlements.
Borio, C. and H. Zhu (2008): “Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: a missing link in
the transmission mechanism?” BIS Working Papers 268, Bank for International Settlements.
Borio, C. E. V. (2003): “Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regula-
tion?” BIS Working Papers 128, Bank for International Settlements.
32
Borio, C., C. F. and P. Lowe (2001): “Pro-cyclicality of the Financial System and Financial Stability:
Issues and Policy Options,” BIS Papers 1, BIS.
Branch, W. and G. Evans (2011): “Monetary policy and heterogeneous expectations,” Economic
Theory, 47, 365–393.
Branch, W. A. and G. W. Evans (2010): “Asset Return Dynamics and Learning,” Review of Financial
Studies, 23, 1651–1680.
Brock, W. A. and C. H. Hommes (1997): “A Rational Route to Randomness,” Econometrica, 65,
1059–1096.
——— (1998): “Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos in a simple asset pricing model,” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 22, 1235–1274.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009): “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 23, 77–100.
Castelnuovo, E. and S. Nistico (2011): “Stock Market Conditions and Monetary Policy in a DSGE
Model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34,
1700–1731.
Cecchetti, S. e. a. (2000): “Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy,” The Geneva Report on the World
Economy No. 2.
Chiarella, C. (1992): “The Dynamics of Speculative Behavior,” Annals of Operations Research, 37,
101 – 123.
Cho, S. and A. Moreno (2006): “A Small-Sample Study of the New-Keynesian Macro Model.” Journal
of Money, Credit & Banking, 38, 1461 – 1481.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler (1999): “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian
Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 1661–1707.
Cochrane, J. (2011): “Discount Rates,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Cochrane, J. H. (2001): Asset Pricing, Princeton et al.: Princeton University Press.
Cont, R. (2001): “Empirical Properties of Asset Returns: Stylized Facts and Statistical Issues.” Quan-
titative Finance, 1, 223 – 236.
——— (2007): “Volatility Clustering in Financial Markets: Empirical Facts and Agent-Based Models,”
in Long Memory in Economics, ed. by G. Teyssiere and A. P. Kirman, Springer, chap. 10, 289 – 309.
Cu´rdia, V. and M. Woodford (2009): “Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy,” NBER Working Papers
15289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Day, R. H. and W. Huang (1990): “Bulls, bears and market sheep,” Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 14, 299–329.
De Grauwe, P. (2010): “Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Macroeconomics,” CESifo Economic Studies,
56, 465–497.
DeGrauwe, P. (2011): “Animal Spirits and Monetary Policy,” Economic Theory, 47, 423–457.
Ding, Z., C. W. J. Granger, and R. Engle (1983): “A Long Memory Property of Stock Market
Returns and a New Model,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 1, 83 – 106.
ECB (2009): “Financial Stability Review,” 2/2009.
——— (2010): “Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy Revisited,” Monthly Bulletin, November 2010,
European Central Bank.
33
Farhi, E. and J. Tirole (2009): “Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts,”
NBER Working Papers 15138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Farmer, J. D. and S. Joshi (2002): “The price dynamics of common trading strategies,” Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 49, 149 – 171.
Filardo, A. J. (2001): “Should monetary policy respond to asset price bubbles? : some experimental
results,” Research Working Paper RWP 01-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Fuhrer, J. C. (2000): “Habit Formation in Consumption and Its Implications for Monetary-Policy
Models,” American Economic Review, 90, 367–390.
Gai, P. and N. Vause (2006): “Measuring Investors’ Risk Appetite,” International Journal of Central
Banking, 2.
Gambacorta, L. (2009): “Monetary Policy and the Risk-Taking Channel,” BIS Quarterly Review,
December, Bank for International Settlements.
Geiger, F. (2011): The Yield Curve and Financial Risk Premia. Implications for Monetary Policy, vol.
465, Springer.
Gertler, M. and N. Kioytaki (2010): “Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle
Analysis,” in Handbook of Monetary Economics, ed. by B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford, Amsterdam:
Elsevier, vol. 3, forthcoming.
Gertler, M. and N. Kiyotaki (2010): “Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle
Analysis,” in Handbook of Monetary Economics, ed. by B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford, Elsevier,
vol. 3 of Handbook of Monetary Economics, chap. 11, 547–599.
Giavazzi, F. and A. Giovannini (2010): “Money and Liquidity in Financial Markets,” CEPR Discus-
sion Papers 7944, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Goodfriend, M. (2007): “How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 21, 47–68.
Greenspan, A. (2002): “Economic Volatility,” Remarks at a symposium sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Auguts 30, 2002, The Federal Reserve Board.
Hommes, C. H. (2006): “Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance,” in Handbook of
Computational Economics, ed. by L. Tesfatsion and K. L. Judd, Elsevier, vol. 2 of Handbook of Com-
putational Economics, chap. 23, 1109–1186.
Hommes, C. H. and F. O. O. Wagener (2009): “Complex evolutionary systems in behavioral finance,”
in Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics and Evolution, ed. by T. Hens and K. R. Schenk-Hoppe,
Elsevier.
Issing, O. (2011): “Lessons for Monetary Policy: What Should the Consensus Be?” IMF Working
Papers 11/97, International Monetary Fund.
Kurz, M. (2011): “Symposium: on the role of market belief in economic dynamics, an introduction,”
Economic Theory, 47, 189–204.
Kyle, A. S. (1985): “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading,” Econometrica, 53, 1315–1335.
LeBaron, B. (2006): “Agent-based Computational Finance,” in Handbook of Computational Economics,
ed. by L. Tesfatsion and K. L. Judd, Elsevier, vol. 2, chap. 24, 1187–1233.
Lengnick, M. and H.-W. Wohltmann (2010): “Agent-based financial markets and New Keynesian
macroeconomics: A synthesis,” Economics Working Papers 2010,10, Christian-Albrechts-University of
Kiel, Department of Economics.
34
——— (2011): “Agent-Based Financial Markets and New Keynesian Macroeconomics - A Synthesis,”
Mimeo.
Lettau, M. and S. C. Ludvigson (2005): “Expected returns and expected dividend growth,” Journal
of Financial Economics, 76, 583–626.
Lux, T. and M. Marchesi (2000): “Volatility Clustering in Financial Markets: A Microsimulation of
Interacting Agents.” International Journal of Theoretical & Applied Finance, 3, 675.
Mandelbrot, B. B. (1963): “The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices,” Journal of Business, 36,
392 – 417.
Mankiw, N. G. and R. Reis (2010): “Imperfect Information and Aggregate Supply,” in Handbook of
Monetary Economics, ed. by B. M. Friedman and M. Woodford, Elsevier, vol. 3, 183 – 229.
McCulley, M. and R. Toloui (2008): “Chasing the Neutral Rate Down. Financial Conditions, Mon-
etary Policy and the Taylor Rule,” Global Central Bank Focus, PIMCO.
Pagan, A. (1986): “The Econometrics of Financial Markets,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 3, 15 – 102.
Phurichai, D. N. and Rungcharoenkitkul (2010): Marrying Monetary Policy with Macroprudential
Regulation: Exploration of Issues, no. occ49 in Occasional Papers, South East Asian Central Banks
(SEACEN) Research and Training Centre.
Posen, A. S. (2006): “Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles,” International Finance, 9, 109–
124.
Rajan, R. G. (2005): “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” NBER Working Papers
11728, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Roubini, N. (2006): “Why Central Banks Should Burst Bubbles,” International Finance, 9, 87–107.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (2011): “Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 25, 29–48.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1997): “The Limits of Arbitrage,” Journal of Finance, 52, 35–55.
Singleton, K. J. (2006): Empirical Dynamic Asset Pricing. Model Specification and Econometric As-
sesment, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, J. B. (1995): “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: An Empirical Framework,” The Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 11–26.
——— (2008): “The Costs and Benefits of Deviating from the Systematic Component of Monetary
Policy,” Keynote Adress at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Conference on Monetary Policy
and Asset Markets, Stanford University.
Thurner, S., J. D. Farmer, and J. Geanakoplos (2010): “Leverage Causes Fat Tails and Clustered
Volatility,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1745, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics,
Yale University.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974): “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Sci-
ence, 185, 1124–1131.
Weber, A. (2008): “Financial Markets and Monetary Policy,” Speech presented at the 12th Annual
Conference of the ECPR/EIS, September, Basel, Deutsche Bundesbank.
Westerhoff, F. H. (2008): “The Use of Agent-Based Financial Market Models to Test the Effectiveness
of Regulatory Policies,” Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und
Statistik), 228, 195–227.
Woodford, M. (2003): Interest and Prices, Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
35
FZID Discussion Papers 
 
Competence Centers: 
 
IK:   Innovation and Knowledge 
ICT:   Information Systems and Communication Systems 
CRFM:   Corporate Finance and Risk Management 
HCM:   Health Care Management 
CM:   Communication Management 
MM:   Marketing Management 
ECO:   Economics 
SE:   Sustainability and Ethics 
 
Download FZID Discussion Papers from our homepage: https://fzid.uni-hohenheim.de/71978.html 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC
 
01-2009 
 
Julian P. Christ 
 
NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY RELOADED: 
Localized Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation 
 
 
IK
02-2009 André P. Slowak MARKET FIELD STRUCTURE & DYNAMICS IN INDUSTRIAL 
AUTOMATION 
 
IK
03-2009 Pier Paolo Saviotti 
and Andreas Pyka 
 
GENERALIZED BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK
04-2009 Uwe Focht, Andreas 
Richter, and Jörg 
Schiller 
 
INTERMEDIATION AND MATCHING IN INSURANCE MARKETS HCM
05-2009 Julian P. Christ and 
André P. Slowak 
 
WHY BLU-RAY VS. HD-DVD IS NOT VHS VS. BETAMAX: 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF STANDARD-SETTING CONSORTIA 
IK
06-2009 Gabriel Felbermayr, 
Mario Larch, and 
Wolfgang Lechthaler 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECO
07-2009 Steffen Otterbach MISMATCHES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREFERRED WORK 
TIME: Empirical Evidence of Hours Constraints in 21 Countries 
 
HCM
08-2009 Sven Wydra  PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES – ANALYSIS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
IK 
09-2009 Ralf Richter and  
Jochen Streb 
CATCHING-UP AND FALLING BEHIND 
KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER FROM AMERICAN 
TO GERMAN MACHINE TOOL MAKERS 
IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC
 
10-2010 
 
Rahel Aichele and 
Gabriel Felbermayr 
 
 
KYOTO AND THE CARBON CONTENT OF TRADE 
 
ECO
11-2010 David E. Bloom and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LOW FERTILITY IN EUROPE 
 
HCM
12-2010 Michael Ahlheim and 
Oliver Frör 
DRINKING AND PROTECTING – A MARKET APPROACH TO THE 
PRESERVATION OF CORK OAK LANDSCAPES 
 
 
ECO
13-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör,  
Antonia Heinke, 
Nguyen Minh Duc, 
and Pham Van Dinh 
 
LABOUR AS A UTILITY MEASURE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES – HOW GOOD IS IT REALLY? 
ECO
14-2010 Julian P. Christ  THE GEOGRAPHY AND CO-LOCATION OF EUROPEAN 
TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC CO-INVENTORSHIP NETWORKS 
 
IK
15-2010 Harald Degner WINDOWS OF TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY 
DO TECHNOLOGICAL BOOMS INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND INNOVATIVENESS? 
 
IK
16-2010 Tobias A. Jopp THE WELFARE STATE EVOLVES:  
GERMAN KNAPPSCHAFTEN, 1854-1923 
 
HCM
17-2010 Stefan Kirn (Ed.) PROCESS OF CHANGE IN ORGANISATIONS THROUGH 
eHEALTH 
 
ICT
18-2010 Jörg Schiller ÖKONOMISCHE ASPEKTE DER ENTLOHNUNG  
UND REGULIERUNG UNABHÄNGIGER 
VERSICHERUNGSVERMITTLER  
 
HCM
19-2010 Frauke Lammers and 
Jörg Schiller  
CONTRACT DESIGN AND INSURANCE FRAUD: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION  
 
HCM
20-2010 Martyna Marczak and 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
REAL WAGES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN GERMANY 
 
ECO
21-2010 Harald Degner and 
Jochen Streb 
 
FOREIGN PATENTING IN GERMANY, 1877-1932 
 
IK
22-2010 Heiko Stüber and 
Thomas Beissinger 
DOES DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY 
DAMPEN WAGE INCREASES? 
 
ECO
23-2010 Mark Spoerer and 
Jochen Streb 
GUNS AND BUTTER – BUT NO MARGARINE: THE IMPACT OF 
NAZI ECONOMIC POLICIES ON GERMAN FOOD 
CONSUMPTION, 1933-38 
 
ECO
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC
 
24-2011 
 
Dhammika 
Dharmapala and 
Nadine Riedel 
 
 
EARNINGS SHOCKS AND TAX-MOTIVATED INCOME-SHIFTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
 
    ECO
25-2011 Michael Schuele, 
Stefan Kirn 
QUALITATIVES, RÄUMLICHES SCHLIEßEN ZUR 
KOLLISIONSERKENNUNG UND KOLLISIONSVERMEIDUNG 
AUTONOMER BDI-AGENTEN  
 
ICT
26-2011 Marcus Müller, 
Guillaume Stern, 
Ansger Jacob and 
Stefan Kirn 
 
VERHALTENSMODELLE FÜR SOFTWAREAGENTEN IM  
PUBLIC GOODS GAME 
 
 
ICT
27-2011 Monnet Benoit 
Patrick Gbakoua and 
Alfonso Sousa-Pozab  
ENGEL CURVES, SPATIAL VARIATION IN PRICES AND 
DEMAND FOR COMMODITIES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
 
ECO
28-2011 Nadine Riedel and 
Hannah Schildberg-
Hörisch 
 
ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
ECO
29-2011 Nicole Waidlein 
 
CAUSES OF PERSISTENT PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES IN 
THE WEST GERMAN STATES IN THE PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 
1990 
 
IK
30-2011 Dominik Hartmann, 
Atilio Arata 
 
MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN POOR 
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES. THE CASE OF CHÁPARRA - 
PERU 
 
IK
31-2011 Peter Spahn DIE WÄHRUNGSKRISENUNION 
DIE EURO-VERSCHULDUNG DER NATIONALSTAATEN ALS 
SCHWACHSTELLE DER EWU 
 
ECO
32-2011 Fabian Wahl 
 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEBENSSTANDARDS IM DRITTEN 
REICH – EINE GLÜCKSÖKONOMISCHE PERSPEKTIVE 
 
ECO
33-2011 Giorgio Triulzi, 
Ramon Scholz, 
Andreas Pyka 
 
R&D AND KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS IN UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY 
RELATIONSHIPS IN BIOTECH AND PHARMACEUTICALS: AN 
AGENT-BASED MODEL 
IK
34-2011 Claus D. Müller-
Hengstenberg, 
Stefan Kirn 
 
ANWENDUNG DES ÖFFENTLICHEN VERGABERECHTS AUF 
MODERNE IT SOFTWAREENTWICKLUNGSVERFAHREN 
ICT
35-2011 Andreas Pyka AVOIDING EVOLUTIONARY INEFFICIENCIES 
IN INNOVATION NETWORKS 
 
IK
36-2011 David Bell, Steffen 
Otterbach, Alfonso 
Sousa-Poza 
 
WORK HOURS CONSTRAINTS AND HEALTH 
 
HCM
37-2011 Lukas Scheffknecht, 
Felix Geiger 
A BEHAVIORAL MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH  
ENDOGENOUS BOOM-BUST CYCLES AND LEVERAGE 
DYNAMICS 
 
ECO
 
 
U n i v e r s i t ä t  H o h e n h e i m
F o r s c h u n g s z e n t r u m 
Innovation und Dienstleistung
Fruwirthstr. 12
D-70593 Stuttgart
Phone  +49 (0)711 / 459-22476 
Fax  +49 (0)711 / 459-23360
Internet  www.fzid.uni-hohenheim.de
